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Abstract
In heterogeneous dense networks where spectrum is shared, users privacy remains one of
the major challenges. On a multi-antenna relay-assisted multi-carrier interference channel, each
user shares the frequency and spatial resources with all other users. When the receivers are not
only interested in their own signals but also in eavesdropping other users’ signals, the cross talk
on the frequency and spatial channels becomes information leakage. In this paper, we propose
a novel secrecy rate enhancing relay strategy that utilizes both frequency and spatial resources,
termed as information leakage neutralization. To this end, the relay matrix is chosen such that the
effective channel from the transmitter to the colluding eavesdropper is equal to the negative of the
effective channel over the relay to the colluding eavesdropper and thus the information leakage
to zero. Interestingly, the optimal relay matrix in general is not block-diagonal which encourages
users’ encoding over the frequency channels. We proposed two information leakage neutralization
strategies, namely efficient information leakage neutralization (EFFIN) and optimized information
leakage neutralization (OPTIN). EFFIN provides a simple and efficient design of relay processing
matrix and precoding matrices at the transmitters in the scenario of limited power and computational
resources. OPTIN, despite its higher complexity, provides a better sum secrecy rate performance by
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Fig. 1. Three overlapping LTE cells. The sum secrecy rates over the cells can be improved if a smart multi-antenna relay
is introduced into the system. The emphasized arrows from BS 1 to the smart relay in the middle and then to UE 1 illustrate
that desired signal strength (together with the direct channel path in red) can be boosted by choosing an appropriate relay
strategy. The emphasized arrows from BS 2 to the smart relay and then to UE 1 illustrate that information leakage (shown
by a dashed arrow in blue) can be neutralized by choosing the relay strategy appropriately.
optimizing the relay processing matrix and the precoding matrices jointly. The proposed methods
are shown to improve the sum secrecy rates over several state-of-the-art baseline methods.
Index Terms
Interference relay channel; Interference neutralization; Non-potent relay; Full-duplex relay;
Amplify-and-forward relay; secrecy rate; worst-case secrecy rate; frequency selective; multi-antenna
systems; colluding eavesdroppers
I. INTRODUCTION
The trend of future wireless network systems is towards spectrum sharing over different
wireless infrastructures such as LTE networks, smart grid sensor networks and WiMAX
networks. With isolated wireless infrastructures, such as multiple non-cooperating LTE cells
(as shown in Figure I), ensuring data security remains a major technical challenge. While
cryptography techniques are employed in most established communication standards, physical
layer security techniques provide an alternative approach when the communicating front-ends
are of limited computation capability and are not able to carry out standard cryptography
methods such as symmetric key and asymmetric key encryption. These applications include
but are not limited to ubiquitous or pervasive computing [1].
With the high demand of wireless applications in recent years, the issues of communication
security become ever more important. Physical layer security techniques [2]–[4] provide an
additional protection to the conventional secure transmission methods using cryptography. As
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early as four decades ago, the seminal work on the secrecy capacity on the wire-tap channel
[5] - the most fundamental model consisting one source node, one destination node and
one eavesdropper - started the era of research on physical layer security. Extensive analysis
and designs have been conducted ever since; physical layer security results can be found in
[2]–[4] and recent tutorial papers [6], [7].
With advantages such as increased cell coverage and transmission rates, relays are incor-
porated into the standards of current wireless infrastructures. The wireless resources in these
systems are frequently shared by many users/subscribers and a potential malicious user in the
system can lead to compromised confidentiality. Many novel strategies have been proposed
to improve the secrecy in
• relay systems, including cooperative jamming (CJ) [8]–[10], noise-forwarding (NF) [11],
a mixture of CJ and NF [12], signal-forwarding strategies such as amplify-and-forward
(AF) and decode-and-forward (DF) [13]–[15]1.
• multi-carrier systems [19]–[21] and multi-carrier relay systems with external eavesdrop-
per(s) [14], [22].
Yet, a joint optimization of secrecy rates over the frequency-spatial resources in a relay-
assisted multi-user interference channel (with internal eavesdroppers) remains an open pro-
blem, as considered here.
We assume that the relay employs an amplify-and-forward (AF) strategy which provides
flexibility in implementation as the relay is transparent to the modulation and coding schemes
and induces negligible signal processing delays [23]. The novel notion of relay-without-
delays, also known as instantaneous relays if the relays are memoryless [24]–[27], refers to
relays that forward signals consisting of both current symbol and symbols in the past, instead
of only the past symbols as in conventional relays. As shown in Figure 2, the instantaneous
relay model provides a matching model of layer-1 repeaters connected networks (such as LTE
networks) and helps us analyze the system performance of nowadays repeaters connected
networks2.
1All aforementioned works assume that the relays are cooperative and trusted. For secure transmission strategies with
untrusted relays, please refer to [16]–[18].
2In modern networks such as LTE, wireless links are often connected using boosters or layer-1 repeaters (simple amplifiers)
[28]. If the time consumed for the signals to travel from a source to a repeater or from a repeater to a destination is counted
as one unit, then the total time for the signal to travel from a source to a destination is two units - the same amount of
time for the signal to travel from a source through a smart AF relay to a destination.
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In order to provide secure transmission over relay-assisted multi-carrier networks, we
propose a relay strategy termed as information leakage neutralization which by choosing relay
forwarding strategies algebraically neutralizes information leakage from each transmitter in
the network to each eavesdropper on each frequency subcarrier. This method is adopted from
a technique on relay networks, termed as interference neutralization (IN). IN has been applied
to eliminate interference in various single-carrier systems, such as deterministic channels [29],
[30], two-hop relay channels [23], [31], [32] and instantaneous relay channels [33]. Our prior
work shows that IN is effective in improving secrecy rates in a two-hop wiretap channel [34].
The proposed method in this paper differs from previous works above as the neutralization
over multi-carrier systems is of high complexity. Another important difference is that here
the colluding eavesdroppers as well as the relays have multiple antennas.
The contribution and outline of this manuscript are summarized as follows:
• We transform a general and complicated sum secrecy rate optimization problem on a
relay-assisted multi-carrier interference channel with mutually eavesdropping users to an
optimization-ready formulation. Systematic optimization techniques can then be applied
to solve for the sum-secrecy-rate-optimal relay strategies and precoding matrices at the
transmitters.
• An illustrative example is given in Section II-A for a basic setting to highlight the
efficiency of information leakage neutralization.
• We propose a novel idea of information leakage neutralization strategies in Section III-A.
These strategies neutralize information leakage from each user to its colluding ea-
vesdroppers on each frequency-spatial channel. The resulting secrecy rate expression
is significantly simplified. Detailed analyzes for the multi-carrier information leakage
neutralization methods are provided. In particular, the minimum number of antennas at
the relay for complete information leakage neutralization is computed in Proposition
1. The required number of antennas depends on the number of data streams sent by
each user, the number of frequency subcarriers and the number of users in the system.
Relevant to applications where relay power must be reserved, the minimum power at
the relay required for information leakage neutralization is computed in Proposition 2.
• We propose an efficient and simple information leakage neutralization strategy (EFFIN)
which ensures secure transmissions in the scenarios of limited power and computational
resources at relay and transmitters. With sufficient power at the relay, we propose an
optimized information leakage neutralization technique (OPTIN) to maximize the secrecy
4
rates while ensuring zero information leakage.
• The achievable secrecy rates from proposed strategies EFFIN and OPTIN are compared
to several baseline strategies by numerical simulations in Section V. Baseline 1 is a
scenario where the relay is a layer-1 repeater and baseline 2 is a scenario with no relay.
Simulation results show that the proposed strategies outperform the baseline strategies
significantly in various operating SNRs.
A. Notations
The set Ca×b denotes a set of complex matrices of size a by b and is shortened to
Ca when a = b. The notation N (A) is the null space of A. The operator ⊗ denotes
the Kronecker product. The superscripts T, H, † represent transpose, Hermitian transpose
and Moore-Penrose inverse respectively whereas the superscript ∗ denotes the conjugation
operation. The Euclidean norm for scalars is written as |.|. The trace of matrix A is denoted
as tr(A). Vectorization stacks the columns of a matrix A to form a long column vector
denoted as vec(A). The function C(A) denotes the log- determinant function of matrix A,
log det (A). The identity and zero matrices of dimension K ×K are written as IK and 0K .
The vector ei represents a column vector with zero elements everywhere and one at the i-th
position. The notation [A]ml denotes the m-th row and l-th column element of the matrix
A. The notation pa:b, 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ n, denotes a vector which has elements [pa, pa+1, . . . , pb]
where p = [p1, . . . , pn].
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In the following subsection, we give an example of a two-user interference relay channel
in which the relay has two antennas and all nodes share two frequency subcarriers. We shall
illustrate that the conventional assumption of block diagonal relay matrix (which maximizes
achievable rates in peaceful systems) cannot be adopted a-priori when secrecy rates are
considered.
A. An example of two users on two frequencies with two antennas at the relay
Transmitter i, i = 1, 2, transmits symbols xi ∈ CM×1 which are spread over M frequency
subcarriers by precoding matrix Pi. For the ease of notation, we assume that precoding
matrix Pi is a square matrix Pi ∈ CM . When user i transmits Si ≤M symbols, then zeros
are padded in xi so that its dimension is always M × 1 and correspondingly zero columns
5
SK
S1
repeater
repeater
DK
D1
R
gKfK
g1f1
h11
hK1
hKK
h1K
(a) a relay-assisted network
S1
SK
D1
DK
h11
hKK
h1K
hK1
R
gKfK
g1f1
(b) instantaneous relay network
Fig. 2. The wireless relay-assisted network with layer one repeaters and one smart relay is shown in subfigure (a). The dotted
lines demonstrate the equivalent links between a source and a destination taking into account the presence of the repeaters.
All paths from source to destination nodes take two time slots and links from source to relay and relay to destination
take one time slot. The equivalent channel is established in subfigure (b) by replacing the relay as an instantaneous relay.
Information going through the instantaneous relay arrives at the destinations at the same time as over the direct links.
are padded in Pi. We assume that the users do not overload the system and therefore Si is
smaller than or equal to the number of frequency subcarriers, here two. Note that Pi may
have low row rank when certain subcarriers are not used. For example, if user i transmits one
symbol on subcarrier 1 but nothing on subcarrier 2, then Pi = [a, 0; 0, 0] for some complex
scalar a. If Pi is diagonal, then each symbol is only sent on one frequency. Denote the m-th
transmit symbol of user i as xi(m) which is randomly generated, mutually independent and
with covariance matrix I2. The precoding matrix Pi satisfies the transmit power constraint
of user i: tr
(
PiP
H
i
) ≤ Pmaxi . Denote the channel gain from transmitter (TX) i to receiver
(RX) j on frequency m as hji(m). For simplicity of the example, we let Si equal two. The
received signal of user i is a vector whose m-th element is the received signal on the m-th
frequency subcarrier,
yi =

 yi(1)
yi(2)

 = 2∑
j=1

 hij(1) 0
0 hij(2)

Pj

 xj(1)
xj(2)

+

 ni(1)
ni(2)

 . (1)
The circular Gaussian noise with unit variance received on the m-th subcarrier at RX i is
denoted as ni(m). If a relay with two antennas is introduced into the system, it receives the
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broadcasting signal from TXs and forwards them to RXs. We denote the received signal at
the relay as a stacked vector of the received signal at each frequency m, with yr(m) ∈ C2×1
representing the received signal on frequency m and the a-th element in yr(m) representing
the signal at the a-th antenna:
yr =

 yr(1)
yr(2)

 = 2∑
j=1

 f j(1) 02×1
02×1 f j(2)

Pj

 xj(1)
xj(2)

+

 nr(1)
nr(2)

 (2)
where nr(m) ∈ C2×1 is a circular Gaussian noise vector received at frequency m with
identity covariance matrix and f j(m) is the complex vector channel from user j to the relay
on frequency m. The relay processes the received signal yr by a multiplication of matrix
R ∈ C4 and forwards the signal to the RXs. Denote the channel from relay to RX i on
frequency m by gi(m) ∈ C2×1. At RX i, the received signal is
yi =
2∑
j=1



 hij(1) 0
0 hij(2)

+

 gHi (1) 01×2
01×2 g
H
i (2)

R

 f j(1) 02×1
02×1 f j(2)



Pj

 xj(1)
xj(2)


+

 gHi (1) 01×2
01×2 g
H
i (2)

R

 nr(1)
nr(2)

+

 ni(1)
ni(2)

 .
(3)
Denote channel matrices
Hij =

 hij(1) 0
0 hij(2)

 , GHi =

 gHi (1) 01×2
01×2 g
H
i (2)

 , Fi =

 f j(1) 02×1
02×1 f j(2)


and the equivalent channel from TX j to RX i as H¯ij = Hij +GHi RFj . An achievable rate
of user 1 is
r1(R) = C
(
I2+H¯11P1P
H
1 H¯
H
11
(
H¯12P2P
H
2 H¯
H
12 +G
H
1 RR
HG1+ I2
)−1)
. (4)
Consider that RX 2 is an eavesdropper. We compute the worst-case scenario in which RX 2
decodes all other symbols perfectly before decoding the messages from TX 1 and RX 2 sees
a MIMO channel and decodes messages x1(1) and x2(2) utilizing both frequencies (with a
MMSE receive filter for example).
y2←1 =



 h21(1) 0
0 h21(2)

+

 gH2 (1) 01×2
01×2 g
H
2 (2)

R

 f1(1) 02×1
02×1 f1(2)



P1

 x1(1)
x1(2)


+

 gH2 (1) 01×2
01×2 g
H
2 (2)

R

 nr(1)
nr(2)

+

 n2(1)
n2(2)


(5)
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An achievable rate is then r2←1(R) = C
(
I2+H¯21P1P
H
1 H¯
H
21
(
GH2 RR
HG2 + I2
)−1)
. An
achievable secrecy rate of user 1 is then the achievable rate of user 1 r1(R) minus the leakage
rate to user 2 r2←1(R) [35]:
rs1(R) = (r1(R)− r2←1(R))+
=
(
C
(
I2+H¯11P1P
H
1 H¯
H
11
(
H¯12P2P
H
2 H¯
H
12 +G
H
1 RR
HG1+ I2
)−1)
− C
(
I2+H¯21P1P
H
1 H¯
H
21
(
GH2 RR
HG2+ I2
)−1))+
.
(6)
The relay processing matrix is defined as
R =

 R11 R12
R21 R22

 (7)
where each submatrix block Rmn forwards signals from frequency n to frequency m. In a
peaceful MIMO IRC, R bares a block diagonal structure, R12 = R21 = 02. The intuition is
that relays should not generate cross talk over frequency channels. However, it is not trivial to
examine the effect of R12 and R21 on secrecy rates as illustrated below and the conventional
block diagonal structure should not be a-priori assumed.
As a numerical example, we compute the secrecy rates with the following randomly
generated channels given in Table I. We set the precoding matrices of TX 1 and TX 2
to be
P1 =

 1 0
1 0

 , P2 =

 1 4
−4 1


which means that TX 1 transmits only one data stream on both subcarriers and TX 2 transmits
two data streams spread over both frequency subcarriers with orthogonal sequences. With
relay matrix RIN (see Table I) a sum secrecy rate of 3.4104 is achievable whereas with
block diagonal matrix RIN,d the sum secrecy rate is 3.1881. A block diagonal relay matrix
does not always improve secrecy rate and therefore in the following we assume a general
non-block-diagonal structure R. In fact, the relay matrix RIN is chosen such that the secrecy
leakage is zero: (H12 +GH1 RF2)P2 = 0 and (H21+GH2 RF1)P1 = 0. Thus, the secrecy
rate from (6) can be simplified to the following
rsi = C
(
I2+H¯11P1P
H
1 H¯
H
11
(
GH1 RR
HG1+ I2
)−1)
. (8)
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TABLE I
RANDOMLY GENERATED CHANNEL REALIZATIONS FOR A TWO USER TWO FREQUENCY INTERFERENCE RELAY
CHANNEL WITH TWO ANTENNAS AT RELAY AND SINGLE ANTENNA AT TXS AND RXS.
H11 =

 0.5129 + 0.4605i 0
0 0.3504 + 0.0950i

 , H21 =

 0.4337 + 0.0709i 0
0 0.1160 + 0.0078i


H12 =

 0.3693 + 0.0336i 0
0 0.1922 + 0.4714i

 , H22 =

 0.1449 + 0.0718i 0
0 0.6617 + 0.0432i


G1 =


0.4460 + 0.5281i 0
0.5083 + 0.5729i 0
0 0.3608 + 0.1733i
0 0.3365 + 0.0861i


, G2 =


0.3933 + 0.0111i 0
0.8044 + 0.2331i 0
0 0.9339 + 0.7859i
0 0.2268 + 0.4107i


F1 =


0.1194 + 0.8624i 0
0.6344 + 0.1582i 0
0 0.6012 + 0.6261i
0 0.1176 + 0.8351i


, F2 =


0.9404 + 0.2720i 0
0.4156 + 0.9280i 0
0 0.9213 + 0.8129i
0 0.5420 + 0.1664i


R
IN =


−0.0364 − 0.0035i −0.1793 − 0.0233i 0.0234 − 0.0575i 0.0574 + 0.0596i
−0.1046 + 0.0925i −0.2837 − 0.0390i −0.0832 − 0.0249i 0.0029 + 0.1567i
0.2729 + 0.0708i −0.1376 + 0.1714i −0.3130 − 0.2977i 0.2012 − 0.1606i
0.0529 + 0.0099i −0.1388 + 0.0348i −0.4690 − 0.3154i −0.0414 − 0.1751i


R
IN,d =


−0.0364 − 0.0035i −0.1793 − 0.0233i 0 0
−0.1046 + 0.0925i −0.2837 − 0.0390i 0 0
0 0 −0.3130 − 0.2977i 0.2012 − 0.1606i
0 0 −0.4690 − 0.3154i −0.0414 − 0.1751i


R
IN,z =


−0.2709 + 0.2267i −0.0820 + 0.1738i −0.0770 + 0.0704i −0.1357 + 0.1183i
−0.1509 + 0.0212i −0.3225 − 0.4885i −0.2088 − 0.0485i 0.6810 + 0.1046i
0.2459 + 0.1223i −0.1315 + 0.0682i −0.2702 − 0.2781i 0.2683 − 0.2842i
−0.0155 + 0.1640i −0.2285 − 0.0472i −0.5114 − 0.2436i −0.0346 − 0.1960i


This motivates our following proposition on information leakage neutralization techniques.
Interestingly, with information leakage neutralization, we can simplify the optimization pro-
blem significantly. The idea is to set the information leakage from each user at each frequency
to zero, in particular, by setting the equivalent channel of x1 from TX 1 to RX 2 and vice
versa in (5) to zero, 

(
H12+G
H
1 RF2
)
P2 = 0(
H21+G
H
2 RF1
)
P1 = 0 .
(9)
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With the properties of the Kronecker product, (9) can be written as

(
(F2P2)
T ⊗GH1
)
(
(F1P1)
T ⊗GH2
)

 vec(R) = B vec(R) =

 − vec(H12P2)
− vec(H21P1)

 = b (10)
The stacked matrix B in the above equation is a fat matrix3. We obtain the relay matrix that
can perform information leakage neutralization:
vec(R) = BH
(
BBH
)−1
b . (11)
Substitute the channel realizations in Table I into the above equation and reverse the vecto-
rization operation, we obtain the relay matrix RIN (please refer to the table for numerical
values).
Remark 1: If the precoding matrices {Pi} are invertible, then the relay matrix R obtained
using (11) is block diagonal. A block diagonal relay matrix means that the relay sets cross
talk over frequency subcarriers to zero and due to the interference leakage neutralization,
the interference from users on the same frequency is also zero. This results in KM parallel
channels without interference. We propose in Section IV-A a suboptimal but very efficient
algorithm which optimizes the achievable rates in this case4.
In fact, the matrix in (11) is not unique, any matrix which is a sum of vec(R) in (11) and a
vector in the null space of B can also neutralize information leakage,
vec(R) = BH
(
BBH
)−1
b+ z, (12)
where z ∈ N (B). With the channel realizations given in Table I, we can generate another
matrix RIN,z which achieves a higher secrecy rate 4.1553, a 17.8% increase of secrecy rate
by optimization over z. This motivates us to investigate an efficient method to find z and
consequently R which neutralizes information leakage and optimizes the secrecy rate at the
same time.
Remark 2: With the optimization over z, the relay matrix is no longer block diagonal
which couples the frequency channels. Although the problem is more complicated, we have
shown in the above example that one can get a better secrecy rate performance. In Section
IV-B, we propose an iterative sum secrecy rates optimization over the relay matrix R and
the precoding matrices {Pi}.
3Care must be taken when users send less than M data streams (when Pi has zero columns. More discussion is provided
later in Proposition 2).
4The achievable rates here are secrecy rates as the information leakage is zero.
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In the following section, we illustrate how the relay matrix can be chosen carefully to amplify
the desired signal strength and at the same time neutralize information leakage in the multi-
user scenario.
III. GENERAL MULTI-USER MULTI-ANTENNA MULTI-CARRIER SCENARIO
In this section, we let the number of TXs and RXs be K ≥ 2. The TXs and RXs have single
antenna and the relay has N antennas. Let the number of frequency subcarriers be M . Denote
the complex channel from TX i to RX j, as a diagonal matrix Hji ∈ CM and the complex
channel from TX i to relay as Fi ∈ CNM×M and from relay to RX j as Gj ∈ CMN×M . The
signal received at the relay is,
yr =
K∑
i=1
FiPi xi+nr (13)
where Fi = diag (f i(1), . . . , f i(M)) and xi ∈ CM×1 are the circular Gaussian transmit
symbols from TX i, with zero mean and identity covariance matrix. The matrix Pi ∈ CM
satisfies the power constraint:
tr
(
PiP
H
i
) ≤ Pmaxi . (14)
With AF strategy, the relay multiplies the received signal yr on the left by processing matrix
R and transmits Ryr. The transmit power of the relay is constrained by Pmaxr ,
tr
(
R
(
K∑
i=1
FiPiP
H
i F
H
i + IMN
)
RH
)
≤ Pmaxr . (15)
The received signal at RX j is
yj =
K∑
i=1
(
Hji+G
H
j RFi
)
Pi xi+G
H
j Rnr + nj (16)
where nj is the circular Gaussian noise at RX j with zero mean and identity covariance
matrix and Gj = diag(gj(1), . . . , gj(M)). For the ease of notation, we define the equivalent
channel from i to j as
H¯ji = Hji+G
H
j RFi (17)
and its (f,m)-element is [H¯ji]fm = hji + gHj (f)Rfm f i(m) which is the equivalent channel
from user i frequency m to user j frequency f .
Each RX is not only interested in decoding its own signal but also eavesdropping from
other TXs. In the following, we define the worst case achievable secrecy rate with colluding
eavesdroppers. For messages xi, all RXs except RX i collaborate to form an eavesdropper
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with multiple antennas and the message xi goes through a multi-carrier MIMO channel to the
colluding eavesdroppers. A worst case secrecy rate is then to assume that all other messages
xj , j 6= i are decoded perfectly and subtracted before decoding xi. The received signals at
RX i and the colluding eavesdroppers are

yi =
K∑
k=1
H¯ikPk xk +G
H
i Rnr + ni
y−i =


H¯1i
.
.
.
H¯(i−1)i
H¯(i+1)i
.
.
.
H¯Ki


Pi xi+


GH1
.
.
.
GHi−1
GHi+1
.
.
.
GHk


Rnr +


n1
.
.
.
ni−1
ni+1
.
.
.
nK


= H¯−iPi xi+G
H
−iRnr +n−i .
(18)
The secrecy rate of user i is [35],
rsi =
(
C

IM +H¯iiPiPHi H¯Hii
(∑
j 6=i
H¯ij Pj P
H
j H¯
H
ij +G
H
i RR
HGi+ IM
)−1
− C
(
IM(K−1)+H¯−iPiP
H
i H¯
H
−i
(
GH−iRR
HG−i+ IM(K−1)
)−1))+
.
(19)
Recall from (17) that the equivalent channel from Tx j to Rx i H¯ij is a function of the
relay processing matrix R, H¯ij = Hij +GHi RFj . The optimization of the aforementioned
secrecy rates is highly complicated due to their non-convex structure. In the following, we
propose the information leakage neutralization technique [33] which is able to neutralize all
information leakage to all eavesdroppers in the air by choosing the relay strategy in a careful
manner. As illustrated in the previous section, with information leakage neutralization, the
secrecy rate expression (19) can be simplified to
rsi = C
(
IM +H¯iiPiP
H
i H¯
H
ii
(
GHi RR
HGi+ IM
)−1)
. (20)
In the following section, we illustrate how we can choose R to achieve a secrecy rate as
such.
A. Information Leakage Neutralization
We choose R such that the equivalent channel of message xi to the eavesdropper in (18)
is neutralized to zero. The challenge of information leakage neutralization in multi-subcarrier
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environment as compared to the single-subcarrier case [33] is that the information leakage
neutralization constraints must be modified to incorporate frequency sharing:
(
Hji+G
H
j RFi
)
Pi = 0, i, j = 1, . . . , K, i 6= j. (21)
Note that we consider the most general scenario where users may only use part of the
spectrum and send less than M data streams and thus Pi may have zero rows and zero
columns. In the following, we show the dependency of the number of antennas at the relay
for information leakage neutralization on these system parameters.
Proposition 1: The number of antennas at the relay, N , required to neutralize all information
leakage from each of the K users at each frequency subcarrier, in a total of M subcarriers,
satisfies
N ≥
√√√√K − 1
M
K∑
i=1
Si (22)
where Si is the number of data streams sent by TX i .
For the proof, please refer to Appendix I. Proposition 1 offers the minimum number of
antennas required to ensure secrecy which depends on the number of users K, the number
subcarriers M and the amount of data streams transmitted Si.
• If every user employs full frequency multiplexing Si = M , we have then
N ≥
√√√√K − 1
M
K∑
i=1
M =
√
K(K − 1). (23)
As N is an integer, we have N ≥ K which is the same criteria as in the flat-fading case
[33].
• If every user sends Si = aM data streams and 0 ≤ a ≤ 1, we have then
N ≥
√√√√K − 1
M
K∑
i=1
aM =
√
aK(K − 1). (24)
For example, in a scenario of K = 3 users, M = 16 frequency subcarriers and each
user transmits Si = 8 data streams
(
a = 1
2
)
, the relay must have at least
⌈√
1
2
· 3 · 2
⌉
=⌈√
3
⌉
= 2 antennas to completely remove any information leakage from any TX to any
RX. This is less than ⌈√3(2)⌉ = 3 if all users send Si = M = 16 data streams.
• Note that the number of antennas required for information leakage neutralization is
independent to the number of frequency subcarriers used by each user (the number of
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non-zero rows of Pi)5. However, the power required to neutralize information leakage
depends on how crowded the subcarriers is. If a lot of frequency subcarriers are occupied,
the relay may not have enough power to neutralize all information leakage as we will
see in the following.
When the number of antennas at the relay is sufficient for information leakage neutralization,
we can use the following method to compute the relay forwarding matrix R for such purpose.
Proposition 2: Any relay matrix R satisfying the information leakage neutralization cons-
traint (34) has the following form:
vec(R) = A† b+ z
where
A =
[((
Pˆ
T
1 F
T
1
)
⊗GH−1
)H
, . . . ,
((
Pˆ
T
K F
T
K
)
⊗GH−K
)H]H
b =
[
− vec
(
H−1 Pˆ1
)H
, . . . ,− vec
(
H−K PˆK
)H]H
z ∈ N (A) .
and Pˆi is a submatrix of Pi, containing its non-zero columns.
For the proof, please refer to Appendix II. From Proposition 2, it follows that there is a
minimum power requirement for information leakage neutralization.
Corollary 1: The minimum power required for information leakage neutralization is
Pmaxr ≥
(
A† b
)H(( K∑
i=1
FiPiP
H
i F
H
i + IMN
)
⊗ IMN
)(
A† b
)
.
For the proof, please refer to Appendix III. Depending on the available transmit power
at the relay, one may only have enough power to neutralize information leakage but not
enough power to further improve the transmission rates. If there is limited power resource
and therefore one must ensure secure transmission with as little power as possible, then one
can set z in Proposition 2 to zero. If there is a high priority of secrecy rates and with abundant
transmit power, one can optimize z for the purpose of sum secrecy rate maximization. In the
following, we investigate algorithms to address these applications.
5The reason is that even if a user does not transmit on a certain frequency, the relay must make sure that it does not
forward the user’s information on other subcarriers to this subcarrier at which the eavesdroppers can decode the information.
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IV. INFORMATION LEAKAGE NEUTRALIZATION ALGORITHMS
In the previous section, we have shown that secrecy rates (20) are achievable by information
leakage neutralization. Also, in order to implement information leakage neutralization, the
number of antennas at the relay, the number of frequency subcarriers and the number of users
in the system must satisfy the relation in Proposition 1. In Proposition 2, we computed the
minimum relay power required in order to perform information leakage neutralization. With
more power available at the relay, we can improve the achievable secrecy rates by optimizing
the relay matrix and the precoding matrices. The optimization of sum secrecy rates can be
written formally in the following:
max
R,{Pi}
K∑
i=1
C
(
IM +H¯iiPiP
H
i H¯
H
ii
(
GHi RR
HGi+ IM
)−1)
such that tr
(
PiP
H
i
) ≤ Pmaxi
tr
(
R
(
K∑
i=1
FiPiP
H
i F
H
i
)
RH
)
≤ Pmaxr .
In the following, we propose two algorithms. The first algorithm EFFIN, in Section IV-A,
considers the scenario where z = 0 in Proposition 2 and all users transmit the maximum
number of data streams allowed Si = M . We observe that in this situation, information
leakage neutralization decomposes the system into KM parallel channels and consequently
both the relay processing matrix R and the precoding matrix Pi can be computed very
efficiently. The second algorithm OPTIN, in Section IV-B, investigates a systematic method
for the computation of R and Pi when there is enough transmit power budget at the relay
to allow further optimization of secrecy rates.
A. Efficient Information Leakage Neutralization (EFFIN)
When every user transmits Si = M data streams and Pi is invertible, we propose the
following algorithm that decomposes the K user interference relay channels with M fre-
quency subcarriers and N antennas at the relay to KM parallel secure channels with no
interference and no information leakage. The information leakage neutralization criteria(
Hij +G
H
i RFj
)
Pi = 0, when Pi is invertible, is equivalent to
Hij +G
H
i RFj = 0 .
Due to the block diagonal structure of Hij , Gi and Fj , one feasible solution of the above
equation is a block diagonal R. With the block diagonal structure, the resulting secrecy rates
15
may be suboptimal, but the information leakage neutralization constraint can be broken down
to the optimization over the diagonal blocks Rmm in R:
hji(m) + g
H
j (m)Rmm f i(m) = 0, i, j = 1, . . . , K, i 6= j. (25)
Following the same approach as before, we stack the constraints for all j 6= i and define
h−i(m) =
[
hH1i(m), . . . , h
H
(i−1)i(m), h
H
(i+1)i(m), . . . , h
H
Ki(m)
]H
G−i(m) =
[
g1(m), . . . , gi−1(m), gi+1(m), . . . , gK(m)
]
.
We obtain h−i(m) +GH−i(m)Rmm f i(m) = 0(K−1)×1 which is equivalent to(
fTi (m)⊗GH−i(m)
)
vec (Rmm) = −h−i(m).
Stacking constraints for all i, we have
A(m) =


(
fT1 (m)⊗GH−1(m)
)
.
.
.(
fTK(m)⊗GH−K(m)
)

 , b(m) =


−h−1(m)
.
.
.
−h−K(m)

 .
With a limited power budget at relay, we propose to implement information leakage neutrali-
zation with the least relay transmit power and utilize the result from Proposition 2, the relay
matrix has the m-th diagonal block equal to
Rmm = vec
−1
(
(A(m))† b(m)
)
(26)
where vec(.)−1 is to reverse the vectorization of a vector columnwise to a M ×M matrix.
After the computation of the relay matrix in (26), R = diag (R11, . . . ,RMM), the optimal
precoding matrices {Pi} are computed by solving Q1.
Q1 : max
{Qi},Qi0
K∑
i=1
C (IM +QiWi)
such that tr (Qi) ≤ Pmaxi , i = 1, . . . , K,
K∑
i=1
tr (QiXi) ≤ P¯maxr .
where we replace PiPHi by positive semi-definite variable Qi and denote the following
matrices
Wi =
(
Hii+G
H
i RFi
)H (
GHi RR
HGi+ IM
)−1 (
Hii+G
H
i RFi
)
,
Xi = F
H
i R
HRFi,
P¯maxr = P
max
r − tr
(
RRH
)
.
(27)
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The objective in Q1 is concave in Qi as Wi is positive semi-definite and the constraints
are linear in Qi. Thus, Q1 is a semi-definite program and can be solved readily using
convex optimization solvers, e.g. CVX6. The optimal Pi is obtained by performing eigenvalue
decomposition on Qi = UiDiUHi and Pi = UiD
1/2
i . The psuedocode of the EFFIN is given
in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 The pseudo-code for Efficient Information Leakage Neutralization (EFFIN)
1: for m = 1→M do ⊲ Compute block diagonal relay processing matrix
2: Compute Rmm = vec−1
(
(A(m))† b(m)
)
with
A(m) =


(
fT1 (m)⊗GH−1(m)
)
.
.
.(
fTK(m)⊗GH−K(m)
)

 , b(m) =


−h−1(m)
.
.
.
−h−K(m)

 .
3: end for
4: The relay processing matrix is R = diag (R11, . . . ,RMM).
5: Solve Q1 using convex optimization solvers and obtain optimal {Qi}.
6: for i = 1→ K do ⊲ Compute precoding matrices
7: Perform eigen-value decomposition, Qi = UiDiUHi . Set Pi = UiD
1/2
i .
8: end for
B. Optimized Information Leakage Neutralization (OPTIN)
In the previous subsection, we have discussed a simple, efficient and power saving solution
of the relay matrix and precoding matrices for secure transmission. One drawback of the
efficient method is that its performance may be suboptimal. In this subsection, we discuss
how to choose the relay and precoding matrices such that the sum secrecy rates are optimized
while ensuring zero information leakage.
To this end, we rewrite the information leakage neutralization constraint (21) to promote
the optimization of secrecy rates, (
H+GHRF
)
P = T (28)
6Given block diagonal R in (26), the equivalent channel Wi and matrix Xi are also block diagonal. It is possible to solve
Q1 using water-filling with K + 1 Lagrange multipliers. For large problem size, it may be more computational efficient
using a tailor made water-filling method. For medium size problems and illustrative purposes, we propose here to solve by
semi-definite programming.
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where H = [H11, . . . ,H1K ; . . . ;HK1, . . . ,HKK ], GH =
[
GH1 ; . . . ;G
H
K
]
, F = [F1, . . . ,FK ]
and P = diag(P1, . . . ,PK). The block diagonal matrix T = diag(T1, . . . ,TK) is the
new optimization variable. Ti is the equivalent desired channel from TX i to RX i as
Ti = (Hii+G
H
i RFi)Pi. By applying pseudo-inverses7 of GH and FP (GH † and (FP)†
respectively), one can rewrite (28) to the following
R = GH † (T−HP) (FP)† . (29)
The maximum achievable sum secrecy rate is the solution of the following problem
max
R,T,{Pi}
K∑
i=1
C
(
IM +TiPiP
H
i T
H
i
(
GHi RR
HGi+ IM
)−1) (30a)
such that tr
(
PiP
H
i
) ≤ Pmaxi , i = 1, . . . , K, (30b)(
H+GHRF
)
P = T, (30c)
tr
(
R
(
FPPH FH + IMN
)
RH
) ≤ Pmaxr (30d)
T = diag (T1, . . . ,TK) . (30e)
Note that in the objective function, the information leakage is neutralized for each user.
Constraints (30b) and (30d) are the transmit power constraints at the TXs and at the relay
respectively. The information leakage neutralization constraint is written as (30c). The op-
timization is not jointly convex in R, T and {Pi}. To simplify the optimization problem,
we propose the following iterative optimization algorithm. Given R and T, we solve Pi
optimally using Q1 in EFFIN.
The second part of the iterative algorithm is to compute the optimal relay strategy R and
the auxiliary variable T (by solving Q2) if the precoding matrices Pi as the solutions of Q1
are given.
Q2 : max
R,T
K∑
i=1
C
(
IM +TiT
H
i
(
GHi RR
HGi+ IM
)−1)
such that R = GH † (T−HP) (FP)† ,
tr
(
R
(
FPPH FH + IMN
)
RH
) ≤ Pmaxr ,
T = diag(T1, . . . ,TK).
7Note that GH has dimension MK × MN and FP has dimension MN × KM . If MN ≥ MK, then GH † =
G
(
G
H
G
)−1
and (FP)† =
(
(FP)H (FP)
)−1
(FP)H. If MN < KM , then GH † =
(
GG
H
)−1
G and (FP)† =
(FP)H
(
FP (FP)H
)−1
.
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Problem Q2 is non-convex. The major challenge is due to the sum of log-determinants in the
objective function and the equality constraints. In the following, we utilize the first equality
constraint and replace R as a function of T. The optimization problem Q2 can be written
as,
Q′2 : max
T
K∑
i=1
(
C
(
Xi+T¯iZi T¯
H
i
)
− C
(
Xi+T¯iYi T¯
H
i
))
such that tr
(
GH † (T−HP)
(
F˜+ IMK
)
(T−HP)HG†
)
≤ Pmaxr ,
T¯i = [Ti, IM ] ,
T = diag(T1, . . . ,TK).
Please see the proof and the definition of Xi,Yi,Zi in (41) in Appendix IV. Although the
optimization problem is simplified, it is still non-convex in T. In the following, we propose
to solve Q′2 with gradient descent method. To this end, we write the Lagrangian of Q′2 as
L(T, λ),
L(T, λ) =
K∑
i=1
(
C
(
Xi+T¯i Zi T¯
H
i
)
− C
(
Xi+T¯iYi T¯
H
i
))
− λ
(
tr
(
GH † (T−HP)
(
F˜+ IMK
)
(T−HP)HG†
)
− Pmaxr
)
=
K∑
i=1
fi(Ti)− λg(T).
(31)
The gradient of the Lagrangian with respect to T∗ is
DT∗ L(T, λ) = 1
ln(2)


DT∗
1
f1(T1) 0M . . . 0M
0M DT∗
2
f2(T2) . . . 0M
.
.
.
.
.
.
0M . . . DT∗K fK(TK)


− λG†GH † (T−HP)
(
F˜+ IKM
)
.
(32)
Please see the proof in Appendix V. We summarize in Algorithm 2 the proposed iterative
algorithm on sum secrecy rate optimization.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
To illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms, we provide in this section
numerical simulations for different system settings. As an example, we simulate the secrecy
rates of a relay assisted network with K = 2 users, M = 8 frequency subcarriers and N = 2
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Algorithm 2 The pseudo-code for Optimized Information Leakage Neutralization (OPTIN)
1: while do ⊲ Compute relay processing matrix
2: Initialize {Pi} and R as the solutions of EFFIN.
3: Solve Q′2 using gradient descent method with gradient (32) and obtain optimal
solution T. Obtain relay processing matrix R from T using (29).
4: With R and T above, solve Q1 using convex optimization solvers and obtain optimal
{Qi}.
5: for i = 1→ K do ⊲ Compute precoding matrices
6: Perform eigen-value decomposition, Qi = UiDiUHi . Set Pi = UiD
1/2
i .
7: end for
8: if sum secrecy rate improvement is less than a predefined threshold then
9: Convergence reached. Break.
10: end if
11: end while
antennas at the relay, unless otherwise stated. To examine the performance of the algorithms
with respect to system signal-to-noise ratio, we vary the transmit power constraint at relay
from 0 to 30 dB while keeping the transmit power constraint at TXs as 10 dB (see Figure 3.)
Similarly, we examine the algorithms by varying the transmit power constraint at TXs from
0 to 30 dB while keeping the transmit power at relay constraint at 23, 27, 30 dB. Note that by
varying the power constraints, we do not force the power of the optimized precoding matrices
and the relay processing matrix to be equal to the power constraints. In the following, we
compare algorithms:
• Baseline 1 (Repeater): the relay is a layer 1 relay and is only able to forward signals
without additional signal processing. This corresponds to setting R = IMN
√
Pmaxr
MN
.
• Baseline 2 (IC): the relay shuts down, i.e. R = 0MN , and we obtain an interference
channel where users eavesdrop each other.
• Proposed algorithm EFFIN: an efficient relay and precoding matrices optimization al-
gorithm outlined in Algorithm 1.
• Proposed algorithm OPTIN: an optimized algorithm whose performance exceeds EFFIN
with a price of higher complexity. OPTIN is outlined in Algorithm 2.
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For each baseline algorithm, we examine the effect of spectrum sharing on achievable secrecy
rates by employing either one of the following spectrum sharing methods:
• Full spectrum sharing (FS): users are allowed to use the entire spectrum. Each TX
measures the channel qualities of the direct channel and the channel from itself to other
RXs. Based on the measured channel qualities, each TX excludes frequency subcarriers
with zero secrecy rates and transmits on the channels with non-zero secrecy rates. For
subcarriers at which more than one user would like to transmit, we assume that the TXs
coordinate so that the TX with a high secrecy rate would transmit on that subcarrier.
Despite such coordination, each user eavesdrops other users on each subcarrier.
• Orthogonal spectrum sharing (OS): users are assigned exclusive portion of spectrum.
Each TX excludes subcarriers with zero secrecy rates and transmits on the channels
with non-zero secrecy rates. Each user eavesdrops other users on each subcarrier.
A. Secrecy rates with increasing relay power
In Figure 3, we show achievable sum secrecy rates over varying the transmit power
constraint at the relay from 0 to 30 dB while keeping the transmit power constraint at
the TXs at 10 dB. As the IC does not utilize the relay, the achievable sum secrecy rates
(plotted with triangles) are constant as the relay power constraint increases. As expected
from intuition, the performance of IC with FS is better than OS because OS has an additional
constraint of subcarrier assignment. The achievable sum secrecy rates achieved by a repeater
decreases with relay transmit power. This is due to the increased amplification noise in AF
relaying. Interestingly, the non-intelligent relaying scheme, e.g. a repeater, may decrease the
secrecy rate significantly, even worse than switching off the relay. However, utilizing an
intelligent relay and choosing the relaying scheme, one can improve the achievable secrecy
rate significantly, about 550% over a simple repeater and about 200% over IC. Although
EFFIN is very simple and efficient, it achieves 94.5% of the sum secrecy rate achieved by
the more complicated algorithm OPTIN.
B. Secrecy rates with increasing TX power
In Figure 4, we simulate the achievable sum secrecy rate by the transmit power constraint at
TXs from 0 to 30 dB while keeping the transmit power at relay constraint at 23, 27, 30 dB. As
the transmit power at TX increases, the sum secrecy rates saturate in both baseline algorithms,
Repeater and IC. With the proposed information leakage neutralization, we see that the
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Fig. 3. The achievable secrecy rates of a two-user IRC with 8 frequency subcarriers is shown with varying relay power
constraint. The TX power constraints are 10 dB and there are two antennas at the relay. The proposed scheme EFFIN and
OPTIN outperform baseline algorithms Repeater and IC by 550% and 200% respectively.
sum secrecy rates grow unbounded with the TX power as each user enjoys a leakage free
frequency channel. Note that the sum secrecy rates achieved by relay with power constraint
at 23, 27, 30 dB are plotted in dotted, dashed and solid lines respectively. When there is only
23 dB available, there is only enough power for information leakage neutralization, but not
enough to further optimize the system performance. Hence, the achievable sum secrecy rates
of EFFIN and OPTIN overlap. With more power available, it is possible to optimize the sum
secrecy rates while neutralizing information leakage and the performance of OPTIN is better
than EFFIN.
C. Secrecy rates with larger systems
In Figure 5, we examine the performance of the proposed algorithms in a slightly larger
systems with N = 4 antennas at the relay and M = 16 frequency subcarriers. The relay
processing matrix is therefore a 64 × 64 matrix. The proposed scheme EFFIN and OPTIN
outperform baseline algorithms Repeater and IC by 200% whereas the efficient EFFIN
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Fig. 4. The achievable secrecy rates of a two-user IRC with 8 frequency subcarriers is shown with varying transmitter
power constraints. The relay power constraint is 30 dB and there are two antennas at the relay. The secrecy rates achieved
by EFFIN and OPTIN grows unbounded with the transmit power at TX whereas the secrecy rates achieved by baseline
algorithms saturate in high SNR regime.
algorithm achieves 94.86% of the sum secrecy rate performance by OPTIN.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
If TX i transmits Si ≤M data streams, then M−Si columns of Pi are zeros. For example,
in a system with 4 subcarriers where TX i transmits 2 data streams spread over 3 subcarriers,
Pi has the following form,
Pi =


∗ ∗ 0 0
∗ ∗ 0 0
0 0 0 0
∗ ∗ 0 0

 . (33)
Denote the non-zero columns of Pi by Pˆi ∈ CM×Si . The information leakage constraint (21)
is equivalent to
(
Hji+G
H
j RFi
)
Pˆi = 0, i, j = 1, . . . , K, i 6= j. (34)
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Fig. 5. The achievable sum secrecy rates of a two-user IRC with 16 frequency subcarriers and 4 antennas at the relay is
shown with varying relay power constraint. The TX power constraints are 10 dB and there are two antennas at the relay. The
proposed scheme EFFIN and OPTIN outperform baseline algorithms Repeater and IC by 200%. EFFIN achieves 94.86%
of the sum secrecy rate performance by OPTIN.
For each i, we stack the constrains for all j 6= i by using GH−i from (18) and defining
H−i = [H
H
1i, . . . ,H
H
(i−1)i,H
H
(i+1)i, . . . ,H
H
Ki]
H.
We write (34) as (
H−i+G
H
−iRFi
)
Pˆi = 0, i = 1, . . . , K (35)
which can be manipulated to the following by performing vectorization on the matrices,((
Pˆ
T
i F
T
i
)
⊗GH−i
)
vec(R) = − vec
(
H−i Pˆi
)
, i = 1, . . . , K. (36)
The matrix H−i has dimension (K − 1)M ×M and the matrix Pˆi has dimension M × Si.
Hence, the product H−iPi has dimension (K−1)M×Si. The number of constraints in (36)
is the number of elements in H−iPi, which is (K − 1)MSi. Summing up all constraints for
i = 1, . . . , K, we have the total number of constraints (K − 1)M∑Ki=1 Si. The number of
variables is the number of elements in R which equals to M2N2. To neutralize information
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leakage at all users, we must satisfy (36) for all i. To this end, the relay must have the
number of antennas N satisfying M2N2 ≥ (K − 1)M∑Ki=1 Si, or
N ≥
√√√√K − 1
M
K∑
i=1
Si. (37)
APPENDIX II
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Stacking the matrices in (34) for all i, we obtain A vec(R) = b. The matrix A is a block
matrix with vertically stacked blocks
(
Pˆ
T
i F
T
i
)
⊗GH−i , for i = 1, . . . , K, and therefore has
dimension
∑K
i=1 Si(K−1)M ×M2N2. The matrix G−i concatenates matrices Gj for j 6= i,
e.g., G−1 = [G2, . . . ,GK ]. As G−i are not mutually independent, A is of low rank. Denote
the number of rows of A by α =
∑K
i=1 Si(K − 1)M and the rank of A by β = rank(A).
The pseudo-inverse of A can be computed by performing singular-value-decomposition on
A,
[A]α×M2N2
= [U1 |U2]

 Γ 0β×(M2N2−β)
0(α−β)×β 0(α−β)×(M2N2−β)



 VH1
VH2

 , (38)
where U1 ∈ Cα×β,U2 ∈ Cα×(α−β) are the left singular vectors in the signal space and null
space of A respectively; VH1 ∈ Cβ×M
2N2
, VH2 ∈ C(M
2N2−β)×M2N2 are the right singular
vectors in the signal space and null space of A respectively; Γ ∈ Cβ×β holds the non-zero
singular values in the diagonal and zeros everywhere else. Thus, the solution of vec(R)
satisfying A vec(R) = b is
vec(R) = V1 Γ
−1UH1 b+V2 y (39)
where y is any vector in the space of CM2N2×1. The result follows by setting z = V2 y as
a vector in the null space of A.
APPENDIX III
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
Using the properties of Kronecker products, the relay transmit power from (15) is equivalent
to
(
A† b+ z
)H ((∑K
i=1FiPiP
H
i F
H
i + IMN
)
⊗ IMN
) (
A† b+ z
)
. By Proposition 2 and (15),
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the minimum transmit power required to satisfy information leakage neutralization is
min
z
(
A† b+ z
)H(( K∑
i=1
FiPiP
H
i F
H
i + IMN
)
⊗ IMN
)(
A† b+ z
)
z=0⇐⇒ tr
((
A† b
)( K∑
i=1
FiPiP
H
i F
H
i + IMN
)(
A† b
)H) ≤ Pmaxr ,
(40)
where the transition is due to the fact that z is in the null space of A and the fact that
Q =
(∑K
i=1FiPiP
H
i F
H
i + IMN
)
⊗ IMN is positive semi-definite and zHQz ≥ 0 for any z.
APPENDIX IV
FORMULATION OF Q′2
Let ETi = eTi ⊗ IM , T¯i = [Ti, IM ] and
F˜ = (FP)† (FP)H † ,Xi =
K∑
m=1
K∑
l=1
HimPm F˜mlP
H
l H
H
il ,
Yi =

 F˜ii −∑Kl=1 F˜ilPHl HHil
−∑Km=1HimPm F˜mi IM

 ,
Zi =

 IM 0M
0M 0M

+Yi .
(41)
With the equality constraint (28), the amplification noise can be written as (42) where F˜ml ∈
C
M is the (m, l)-th block matrix in F˜. As a result, the objective can be written as
K∑
i=1
C
(
IM +TiT
H
i
(
GHi RR
HGi+ IM
)−1)
=
K∑
i=1
(
C (IM +TiTHi +GHi RRHGi)
− C (IM +GHi RRHGi)
)
=
K∑
i=1
(
C
(
Xi+T¯i Zi T¯
H
i
)
− C
(
Xi+T¯iYi T¯
H
i
))
.
Similarly, the power constraint is written as (43).
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GHi RR
HGi = E
T
i G
HRRHGEi
= ETi (T−HP) (FP)† (FP)H † (T−HP)HEi
= [−Hi1P1, . . . ,Ti−HiiPi, . . . ,−HiK PK ]


F˜11 . . . F˜1K
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
F˜K1 . . . F˜KK




−PH1 HHi1
.
.
.
THi −PHi HHii
.
.
.
−PHKHHiK


=
K∑
m=1
K∑
l=1
HimPm F˜mlP
H
l H
H
il −Ti
K∑
l=1
F˜ilP
H
l H
H
il −
K∑
m=1
HimPm F˜miT
H
i +Ti F˜iiT
H
i
= Xi− IM + [Ti, IM ]

 F˜ii −∑Kl=1 F˜ilPHl HHil
−∑Km=1HimPm F˜mi IM



 THi
IM


= Xi− IM +T¯iYi T¯Hi ,
(42)
tr
(
R
(
FPPH FH + IMN
)
RH
)
= tr
(
GH † (T−HP) (FP)† (FPPHFH + IMN ) (FP)†H (T−HP)HG†)
= tr
(
GH † (T−HP)
(
(FP)† (FP)†H + IKM
)
(T−HP)HG†
)
= tr
(
GH † (T−HP)
(
F˜+ IKM
)
(T−HP)HG†
)
≤ Pmaxr .
(43)
APPENDIX V
COMPUTATION OF THE GRADIENT OF LAGRANGIAN (31)
Recall the Lagrangian from (31),
L(T, λ) =
K∑
i=1
(
C
(
Xi+T¯i Zi T¯
H
i
)
− C
(
Xi+T¯iYi T¯
H
i
))
− λ
(
tr
(
GH † (T−HP)
(
F˜+ IMK
)
(T−HP)HG†
)
− Pmaxr
)
=
K∑
i=1
fi(Ti)− λg(T),
where fi(Ti) = C
(
Xi+T¯i Zi T¯
H
i
)
− C
(
Xi+T¯iYi T¯
H
i
)
denotes the secrecy rates of TX i
and g(T) denotes the power constraint. We compute the gradient of the Lagrangian (31) with
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respect to T,
DT∗ L(T, λ) = DT∗
K∑
i=1
fi(Ti)− λDT∗ g(T).
As fi(Ti) is independent to Tj for j 6= i, the derivative can be written in a block diagonal
form
DT∗ L(T, λ) = diag
(DT∗
1
f1(T1), . . . ,DT∗K fK(TK)
)− λDT∗ g(T). (44)
The gradient of the objective function fi(Ti) with respect to T∗i is
DT∗i fi(Ti) = DT∗i C
(
Xi+T¯i Zi T¯
H
i
)
−DT∗i C
(
Xi+T¯iYi T¯
H
i
)
. (45)
We begin with
ln(2)DT∗i C
(
Xi+T¯i Zi T¯
H
i
)
= DT¯∗i ln det
(
Xi+T¯i Zi T¯
H
i
)
· DT∗i T¯
∗
i
= vec
((
Xi+T¯i Zi T¯
H
i
)−1
T¯iZi
)T
· ∂ vec(T¯
∗
i )
∂ vec(T∗i )
= vec
((
Xi+T¯i Zi T¯
H
i
)−1
T¯iZi
)T  IM2
0M2


=
[(
Xi+T¯i Zi T¯
H
i
)−1
T¯iZi
]
(:,1:M)
=
(
Xi+T¯iZi T¯
H
i
)−1
T¯i

 IM +F˜ii
−∑Km=1HimPm F˜mi

 .
(46)
Similarly, we have
ln(2)DT∗i C
(
Xi+T¯iYi T¯
H
i
)
=
(
Xi+T¯iYi T¯
H
i
)−1
T¯i

 F˜ii
−∑Km=1HimPm F˜mi

 . (47)
Thus, we have the gradient of fi(Ti) as
DT∗i fi(Ti)
=
1
ln(2)

(Xi+T¯i Zi T¯Hi )−1 T¯i

 IM +F˜ii
−∑Km=1HimPm F˜mi


−

(Xi+T¯iYi T¯Hi )−1 T¯i

 F˜ii
−∑Km=1HimPm F˜mi



 .
(48)
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The last step of computing the gradient of the Lagrangian is to compute
DT∗ tr
(
GH † (T−HP)
(
F˜+ IKM
)
(T−HP)HG†
)
= G†GH † (T−HP)
(
F˜+ IKM
)
.
(49)
Combining (44), (48) and (49), the gradient of the Lagrangian is obtained.
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